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The many ways that people use, exploit, care for and 
engage with ocean space have changed significantly 
over the course of the past century. The ocean was once 
primarily viewed—and governed—as a surface across 
which goods could be shipped. Today, in part due to 
technological advances and newly available methods for 
extracting wealth from the sea, the ocean is increasingly 
being reframed—and re-regulated—as a space for the 
‘blue economy’. And importantly, the proponents of this 
blue-tinged growth promise a triple win on the ecological, 
social and economic fronts.
In this brief, we will explore the politics behind the promise 
of ‘blue growth’. We have discovered that the discourse 
around blue growth, blue economy, blue revolution and 
the like is a masterfully mixed and powerful cocktail. 
First of all, this discourse quenches the social thirst for 
action in the face of climate change by attracting private 
investment for protected marine areas and sustainable 
tourism. Secondly, it satisfies the growing global demand 
for healthy food and nutrition through the expansion 
of capital-intensive large-scale aquaculture, while 
brushing off the negative socio-ecological impacts of this 
technology. And finally, it refreshes the palate with a burst 
of wind energy and a splash of new deep sea minerals 
without disturbing the familiar and persistent flavour of 
oil and gas.
The ingredients that make up this mix are the subject 
of this brief, and our intention is to explore the function 
of each component of the cocktail. By doing so, we 
hope to provide a critical analysis of the interests and 
agendas behind blue growth, as well as the implications 
of this trend. We are not able to fully explore the many 
dimensions and sectors of the vast ocean environment 
in this short brief.1 Instead, we focus on what we see as 
the three central components, each of which had its own 
history and trajectory well before blue growth became 
a buzzword. What however makes this such a potent 
cocktail is the synergy of the three elements, brought 
together in one elegant framework for reframing ocean 
politics that can be supported by many stakeholders. This 
‘blue fix’ is made up of three main ingredients:2
•	1 part conservation fix
•	1 part protein fix
•	1 part energy/extractive fix
The term ‘fix’ is useful because its multiple meanings 
convey an addiction to a particular mode of extraction and 
production. It also describes how the formation of fixed 
capital in the shape of new infrastructure and investments 
in specific places (e.g. ports, luxury hotels, oil rigs and 
cargo ships) ‘fixes’ or sinks over-accumulated money 
capital into physical objects. Fixed capital also creates new 
opportunities for the circulation of other forms of capital 
(money, commodities) in new places and in new ways 
(e.g. investment in new regions or countries, and in new 
sectors such as deep sea mining). In times of crisis, this 
creates a temporary ‘fix’, or solution, to whatever may be 
hindering capital accumulation (the generation of surplus 
based on investments). We also use the term ‘fix’ to show 
how blue growth is simultaneously about staking out new 
opportunities for capital accumulation while at the same 
time accommodating existing formations of fixed capital 
(that is, actual investments into for example ports).
While it is important to track the discourse of blue growth, 
as some are beginning to do,3 the energy required to keep 
up with the next blue play on words also helps obscure 
the fact that if taken seriously, the blue economy has very 
real implications for how access to and control over ocean 
space is distributed, and for who is included in or excluded 
from these processes and politics. In the euphoria of self-
congratulatory celebrations following blue fora – where 
policymakers clink glasses with investors, conservation 
NGOs and wind energy titans before gulping down 
highballs of this ‘blue fix’ – there is a tendency to ignore 
the social and ecological hangover that this cocktail will 
most certainly cause.
In theory, protecting marine areas is an important 
part of mitigating climate change. But in practice, 
what conservation is achieving at the national level is 
overshadowed by the ongoing expansion of offshore 
drilling for oil and gas. Although the transition to wind 
and solar energy is emphasised, the deep sea mining for 
minerals required by these new technologies launches us 
into unknown ecological territories with little-understood 
consequences. Finally, small-scale capture fishing is 
effectively being squeezed out, while industrial capture 
fishing remains well positioned to expand into as well as 
supply industrial aquaculture with fish feed from small 
pelagic fish. The social and ecological consequences of 
these shifts are rarely addressed in blue growth policies.
Introduction
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For thousands of years, small-scale fishers around 
the world have enjoyed preferential access to fishery 
resources, and traditional and customary rules have 
been shaped and entrenched in fishing communities. In 
Oceania, for example, the sea was governed as an integral 
space in society, just like the land.4 Over time, however, 
the evolving ways in which the ocean has been used to 
generate profit have been key drivers of changes in marine 
regulatory regimes. The result is that small-scale fishers 
are increasingly being pushed out of the spaces they have 
historically lived in and lived from. This trend has recently 
led global fisher movements to frame their struggles 
around the concept of ‘ocean grabbing’.5 The emphasis 
on the dynamic of ‘grabbing’ is recent; it specifically 
arose from the so-called ‘convergence of crises’ (climate, 
environment, energy, food and finance).6 However the 
enclosure of ocean space and the institutionalisation of 
property regimes allowing for the appropriation of ocean 
resources by new users has a long history.
A major shift in how the sea was governed developed 
from the 17th century onwards as the transport of 
commodities by ocean became increasingly important for 
commercial capitalism.7 Transport became the dominant 
use of the sea, and was the foundation for the economic 
development of European colonial powers at the time. The 
main political and economic interest in the oceans was to 
control and ensure free passage along trade routes. This 
political-economic imperative shaped the governance of 
the seas during this period.8
By the 1900s, the regime that was primarily oriented 
towards the transportation of goods gave way to one 
that facilitated the extraction of ocean resources. The 
regulation of ocean space shifted towards a territorial 
model, whereby governments increasingly sought to 
incorporate coastal zones into recognised sovereign 
territory in order to provide security for investments 
in coastal fishing and mineral extraction. In the 1930s, 
pioneered by the Gulf of Mexico in 1937, offshore oil 
drilling became possible beyond the three nautical miles 
that was at the time accepted by most countries as the 
territorial zone.9
The development of offshore oil drilling capabilities in 
this manner marked the beginning of a regulatory model 
based on state enclosure and the control of ocean space, 
and allowed for concessions to be doled out to extractive 
industries. Initially triggered by the increasing interest in 
oil following World War II, states began to claim national 
rights to resources further and further away from the 
coast. In 1945, the US claimed limited national rights to 
the resources on the entire continental shelf adjacent to 
its coastline,10 and El Salvador became the first nation to 
claim sovereignty over the area extending 200 nautical 
miles from its coastline in 1950.
In an attempt to better coordinate this scramble for 
territorial control over the sea, the United Nations hosted 
the first two Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 
and 1960. However, it was the third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in 1973 that set in motion the development 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). This convention, ratified by 167 countries and 
the European Union,11 recognises the rights of coastal 
states to “exploit, develop, manage and conserve all 
resources –fish or oil, gas or gravel, nodules or sulphur – 
to be found in the waters, on the ocean floor and in the 
subsoil of an area extending 200 miles from its shore”.12
The ratification of UNCLOS stands out as the largest 
enclosure of territorial space in history.13 At the time of 
the third conference in 1973, 25 states maintained claims 
to a three nautical mile zone; 15 states to zones between 4 
and 10 miles; 66 states to a 12-mile zone; and one country 
to a 200-mile zone.14 While these enclosures of territorial 
space were significant, they were dwarfed in comparison 
to the 659.662 square kilometres (equivalent to 66% of 
total land territory) of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 
enclosed through UNCLOS15. UNCLOS thus instituted a 
‘spatial fix’ to reconcile the contrasting interests between 
different uses of ocean space: on the one hand facilitating 
the free flow of commodities and providing access to 
distant markets, and on the other hand defining areas of 
property rights to allow for fixed investments.16 UNCLOS 
ensured “a territorially governed coastal zone for fixed 
investment and resource extraction and a non-territorially 
governed deep sea dedicated to facilitating capital 
circulation.”17 However, new technologies and the ever-
expanding quest for resources under capitalism meant 
that the ‘fix’ reached through the UNCLOS regime was 
only a fleeting one.18
Enclosing ocean space
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As interest in ocean resources has grown, so have 
concerns about how to organise the use of increasingly 
crowded ocean space as well as around the impact of 
climate change on falling fish stocks and the marine 
environment. In the context of efforts to advance a 
sustainable development agenda building on the idea of 
‘green growth’, the Rio+20 conference in 2012 (the follow 
up to the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit), succeeded 
in placing oceans firmly on the international agenda. The 
Rio Ocean Declaration, issued on Oceans Day at Rio+20 
by the conference co-chairs, notes “with great concern the 
many threats and negative drivers that are compromising 
the ability of the oceans to continue providing essential 
resources, food and nutritional security, and critically 
important services to the global community”. It further lists 
a series of well-known threats, including climate change, 
ocean acidification, pollution, overfishing, IUU fishing, 
destructive fishing practices, and habitat destruction and 
degradation.19
An analysis of official sessions and side events at Rio+20 
shows that the term “blue economy was consistently 
used to draw attention to oceans”20 by a variety of 
actors, including representatives of intergovernmental 
organisations like FAO and UNDP, representatives of 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and conservation 
organisations. Silver and colleagues note that “when 
arguing for particular oceans problems, solutions, and 
participants, many speakers [at official sessions and side-
events] worked to bring more specific meaning to the term 
[blue economy], often in ways that were inconsistent or 
incompatible”.21 Some participants used the term to 
describe natural capital, or the economic value of natural 
resources; others went further and used it to ‘sell’ the 
notion of “oceans as good business”; and some SIDS used 
it strategically to attract attention and funds and to identify 
new partners.
More recent attempts to describe or define blue growth 
show that consensus on its meaning is still elusive, and 
that there are “some conflicts in interpretation that are 
likely to be irreconcilable. As such, any attempt to define 
the Blue Economy may result in [a] particular lens being 
privileged.”22 However for Jacqueline Alder, who leads the 
Blue Growth Initiative at FAO, this vagueness has strategic 
value. She explains: “[w]e’ve designed our blue growth 
program to be fairly broad, so countries can decide which 
way they want to go”.23
Ignited at Rio+20 in 2012, blue growth subsequently 
spread to the international scene. Governmental 
and intergovernmental institutions, together with 
environmental NGOs, academia, corporations and finance 
institutions, have since that time been driving a series 
of international conferences and producing countless 
reports and articles, inter-governmental policy frameworks 
and national level blue growth strategies. Indeed, this 
margin for interpretation has fuelled a proliferation of 
national and regional level programmes and policies 
that draw on blue economy and blue growth language 
(i.e. Norway, the European Union, India, South Africa, and 
Indonesia). Some governments have gone so far as to 
establish departments or ministries for blue growth or 
economy.24
In 2013, the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) launched its Blue Growth Initiative (BGI). This was 
followed by the Global Oceans Action Summit in 2014, 
co-hosted by the FAO and the World Bank, which brought 
together some 600 representatives from governments, 
intergovernmental institutions, environmental NGOs, 
philanthropic organisations and the corporate sector to 
discuss blue growth.25 Other events that are working to 
advance the blue growth discourse include the annual 
Our Oceans conference (originally initiated by the US 
State Department), the next of which will be held in Bali 
in October 2018; the conferences of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and The 
Economist’s World Oceans Summits. The latter brings 
together political leaders and policymakers, heads 
of global business, scientists, NGOs and multilaterals 
and focuses specifically on investment and business 
opportunities in the areas of fisheries, aquaculture, 
conservation and tourism.26
In short, the blue economy discourse has opened a space 
for a broad and seemingly precarious coalition of diverse 
actors and agendas. All the buzz around blue growth, blue 
economy, blue revolution, blue investors fora, blue carbon, 
blue mining and even blue fashion can be dizzying. Much 
of this is and will remain hype and projection, but to 
what extent does the flood of new language provide a 
The promise of blue growth
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Agenda 21, a result of the 1992 Earth Summit, was broadly 
aimed at achieving ‘sustainable development’. 27 The ocean 
component of this agenda involves addressing marine 
protection, the sustainable use and management of 
living resources within the EEZs and in the high seas, and 
climate change.28 These laudable aims notwithstanding, 
steady carbon emissions continue driving ocean 
acidification, which causes coral bleaching and declining 
shellfish populations. Overfishing and pollution have 
led to a collapse in fish stocks. Islands of plastic have 
formed in the sea, mixing with agrochemical runoff from 
conventional agriculture. And even when offshore drilling 
doesn’t result in oil spills, toxic by-products are leaked 
into the surrounding water.29 Despite the gravity of the 
situation and the range of global initiatives to address it, 
the sustainable development agenda has largely failed 
from an ecological perspective.
Although the sustainable development agenda has also 
failed to mobilise funders, international commitments to 
conservation and sustainable development continue to 
proliferate: for example the Aichi targets of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Climate change is a growing 
concern in societies across the globe, but in practice the 
actual budgetary commitments of national governments 
and donors lag behind estimates of the funding that is 
needed to meet such global targets. To deal with this 
funding gap, NGOs like WWF argue that private capital 
is essential: “The private sector will make or break the 
SDGs.”30
The problem: the goals of investors seeking 
profit-making opportunities and the 
environmental protection demanded by the 
public seem to be at odds. The conservation 
fix:	turn	ocean	conservation	into	an	attractive	
investment opportunity while boosting public 
relations.
The framing of ocean conservation efforts in the 
blue growth agenda fits into the format pioneered by 
mainstream conservation over the last two decades. 
What some have called ‘for-profit conservation’ is based 
on the idea of “economically efficient means of mitigating 
climate change and conserving biological diversity 
without curtailing economic growth”.31 At its core, this 
follows the reasoning of market-based environmentalism: 
environmental degradation and climate change are 
seen as market failure, as nature remains insufficiently 
integrated into the market system.32 From this 
perspective, the solution is to make nature visible and 
legible to capital.33 Under this presumption, once the 
economic value of ‘nature’ and its ‘ecosystem services’ 
is documented, heads of states, CEOs of transnational 
corporations, investors and everyone else will factor the 
costs into their decisions and stop destroying nature .
Furthermore, “selling nature to save it”34 allows 
conservation to pay for itself.35 This approach relies on 
identifying money-making opportunities in conservation 
projects that can be turned into assets. It is hoped that 
this tactic will provide an attractive return on investment 
(ROI). This method of environmental protection effectively 
useful set of smoke and mirrors to distract from the very 
real territorial, ecological and social implications of this 
arrangement among new, old and at times competing 
ocean industries, as well as actors pushing large-scale 
conservation?
To explore the material consequences of the 
implementation of the blue growth agenda and to 
analyse why such diverse interests might be drawn into 
a common arrangement, the following sections offer an 
initial exploration of the three key ingredients that make 
up the blue fix cocktail: (i) the conservation fix; (ii) the 
protein fix; and (iii) the energy/extractive fix. Although we 
have separated these three elements here for analytical 
purposes, in practice the flavours and processes blend 
and overlap in contextually specific ways. We have 
included boxes on diverse cases throughout to highlight 
some of these specificities. Not all oceans sectors receive 
the attention they deserve. Shipping and related port 
activities, for example, certainly deserve closer attention. 
Not only do they account for a significant proportion of 
existing ocean economies, but are also projected to be 
among the fastest growing ocean sectors and thus remain 
a backbone of global trade.
The conservation fix
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shifts the priority away from addressing the most urgent 
ecological crises, which might be antagonistic to the 
interests of prevailing industries. Instead, conservation 
is framed as complementary to and something to be 
developed in close partnership with business interests. 
In the words of WWF: “Achieving the SDGs represents 
a business opportunity. Poverty, inequality, water 
scarcity, climate change and the degradation of natural 
resources and services are all ultimately bad for business. 
Conversely, investing in meeting the SDGs can unlock new 
markets and opportunities and secure a company’s long-
term prosperity.”36
The blue growth agenda has been seamlessly woven into 
the SDGs, with a specific focus on SDG 14: “Conserve and 
sustainably use the ocean, seas and marine resources 
for sustainable development.” This goal, coupled with 
the Aichi target to protect more than 10% of territorial 
waters by 2020, has encouraged state governments 
to further develop this vision of marrying investment 
opportunities for companies and investors with ocean 
conservation. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), especially 
large ones that exceed 100,000 square kilometres, have 
emerged as one key solution to this challenge and have 
been gaining traction since 2006.37 The Commission of the 
European Union (EC) has also been spotlighting a focus 
on climate change via MPAs in its work on blue growth. 
According to a recap article in an EC publication from the 
Our Ocean conference held in 2017 in Malta: “[Climate] 
is an action area the EU is taking very seriously, so Our 
Ocean was a fitting place to announce new funding of 
€20 million to support MPAs in African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries through the Biodiversity and Protected 
Areas Management Programme. Together with Germany, 
there will be more support for a new cross-sectoral and 
cross-boundary multi-stakeholder platform to be in place 
by 2020.”38
Large environmental NGOs and philanthropic 
organisations have also gotten on board: National 
Geographic’s Pristine Seas project, Pew Charitable Trusts’ 
Pew Bertarelli Ocean Legacy Project, and Conservation 
International’s Seascapes Program have been central 
to establishing 22 large MPAs (LMPAs) globally, in 
collaboration with nation states.39 And private banks 
like Credit Suisse have joined forces with WWF to make 
the case for conservation as an attractive investment 
opportunity. They see money making opportunities 
coming from “[i]nvestments in the infrastructure and 
sustainable management of ecosystem services, e.g., 
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investing in lodges and trails to foster ecotourism or in 
solar arrays for power generation, or the monetization 
of ecosystem services (e.g., watershed protection) and 
goods derived from sustainable forestry, agriculture or 
aquaculture operations.”40
According to the OECD, tourism represented 26% of the 
value added to the ocean economy in 2010, surpassed 
only by offshore oil and gas. Although a thorough review 
of the many implications of tourism in the blue economy 
framework is beyond the scope of this report, we highlight 
here the way it has been leveraged to make the case for 
private investment in ocean conservation. World Bank 
bloggers make their pitch as follows:
That nature is the foundation for much of the 
world’s tourism is clear—travellers are willing to 
pay a premium for a room with an ocean view, 
and words like “pristine,” “remote,” and “unspoiled” 
are frequently assigned to amenities like beaches, 
coral reefs, and panoramic seascapes. The 
dependency of the travel and tourism industry 
on a healthy environment goes much deeper 
than that, however. Not only does a reef provide 
entertainment value for seaside visitors, but it can 
deflect waves that cause erosion and reduce the 
risk of storm surges that can harm the industry’s 
bottom line.41
In order to bolster these arguments, the Nature 
Conservancy has partnered with the World Bank in an 
initiative called Mapping Ocean Wealth. They claim that 
“[t]his knowledge can enable smarter investments in 
management and conservation actions that support both 
nature and the tourism businesses that support coastal 
economies.” 42 Quantifying possible returns is seen as 
essential to recruiting investors. In the excitement about 
BOX 1
Operation Phakisa, South Africa: MPAs, oil and gas . . . but not 
small scale fishers
Operation Phakisa means ‘hurry up’ in Sesotho. It was launched by South African President Jacob Zuma in 
July 2014, in his own words to “help us implement the National Development Plan, with the ultimate goal 
of boosting economic growth and creat[ing] jobs”.50 In an announcement about the new Africa Blue Econ-
omy Forum, the former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa also highlighted 
Operation Phakisa and echoed the expectations raised by the South African government with reference 
to the creation of “one million new jobs by 2030 and add ZAR 177 billion [GBP 10.2 billion] to the country’s 
GDP”.51 However, Thean Potgieter, professor at Wits School of Governance, seems less optimistic, stating 
that “even achieving half of this target would be great”.52
Exaggerated or not, these large numbers stem from prospects of development in the four main sectors 
of Operation Phakisa: offshore oil and gas; marine transportation (including port development); 
industrial aquaculture (mainly high-value export species); and marine protection services (secured 
through MPAs) and tourism. When the scope and development plans of the operation became 
clearer to the general public and fishing communities, actors not previously included in the policy 
dialogue began to react. In 2017, the fisher movement Coastal Links co-hosted a meeting with 
civil society organisations where two reasons for concerns were raised: firstly, the development 
plans of the coastal municipalities had not addressed the rights and needs of fishing communities 
in relation to Operation Phakisa; and secondly, the draft bill on Marine Spatial Planning tabled in 
Parliament failed to provide a mechanism that would enable civil society to participate fully and 
effectively in decision making about the implementation of the plan. Furthermore, the draft set 
of regulations for 22 new MPAs announced by the government in 2016 sits alongside its vision of 
drilling 30 new offshore oil wells in the next 10 years53 as part of Operation Phakisa.
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BOX 2
Kiribati: deep sea mining and Marine Protected Areas in the name 
of sustainability
Kiribati’s former President Anote Tong is internationally renowned for putting the consequences of sea 
level rise for Pacific Island states firmly on the international agenda. However, his political solutions to this 
dire issue draw on a blue economy framework, and have recently been referred to as ‘seabed grabbing’.54 
As Tong remarked to the UN General Assembly in 2014, “the ocean plays a pivotal role in the sustainable 
development of my country. Our vision for achieving sustainable development hinges on the blue econo-
my, on the conservation and sustainable management of our marine and ocean resources.”
This vision of the blue economy has also involved concessions for deep sea mining in large swathes of Kiri-
bati’s EEZ.55 Other sectors, such as small-scale fishing, do not feature as part of the country’s blue econ-
omy agenda.56 Even though the environmental impacts are still poorly understood, sourcing the key ele-
ments for wind turbines and photovoltaic batteries via deep sea mining is framed as part of the new clean 
energy-based blue economy. In the words of a former Kiribati minister: “[Deep sea mining], what an ironic 
story! First they tell us we have a problem because the Western countries burn too many non-renewable 
fossil fuels and now the same countries want to take our non-renewable minerals to solve the problem?”57 
Both of these projects were pushed through with no public consultation. As noted by a public official, “[i]
f all this activity had gone to the public, people, the media, would come and question the integrity of our 
government. Conservation here and mining next door, I mean honestly, how credible does that make your 
political intentions?”58
identifying the ocean’s natural wealth, crucial questions 
about whether for profit conservation will actually address 
the dire ecological and social issues in ocean and coastal 
areas are cast aside.
Once investors are convinced of the possible returns, the 
mechanisms put in place to channel funds are diverse 
and warrant much deeper scrutiny. Examples include blue 
bonds,43 WWF’s Financial Instruments for the Recovery of 
Marine Ecosystems (FIRME),44 and new institutional LMPA 
setups.45
Importantly, these rapidly evolving and complex 
mechanisms for channeling private investment into 
ocean conservation do nothing to limit environmentally 
harmful activities in those countries. Banks like JP Morgan 
and Credit Suisse appear to be driven more by the high 
returns they see in green bonds and conservation finance 
than by investments in a good cause. “[I]n general, they 
invest more heavily in polluting industries, such as 
fracking and the extraction of oil sands.”46 Meanwhile 
the Seychelles has established no fishing zones, but has 
continued to allow petroleum exploration in its MPA and 
the construction of an Indian naval base within a World 
Heritage site.47
Given its spotty track record, it may seem easy to disregard 
‘blue finance’ as overhyped. Yet in the context of ocean 
space, the regulatory reforms being initiated to facilitate 
for-profit conservation are very significant in that they 
follow up on historical enclosure processes and give NGOs 
significant roles in the governance of MPAs. While some 
view the lack of private property in much of ocean space 
as a limitation to profit generation, “large-scale ocean 
governance initiatives built around MSP [Marine Spatial 
Planning] and/or LMPAs may be seen as complementary 
to addressing the property question, in the sense that 
they seek to order and ration ocean space and resources, 
identify ‘appropriate’ uses/users, and grant them greater 
regulatory certainty and/or secure access”.48 Even if the 
ROI in ocean conservation areas doesn’t end up amounting 
to much, expanding legal control over those areas to new 
constellations of actors – including environmental NGOs, 
philanthropic foundations and ‘impact investors’ – may 
end up being much more attractive in the long run. This 
is an issue that merits close scrutiny in the years to come, 
as vast areas are being turned into LMPAs.49
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FAO and OECD projections indicate that global catches 
in wild capture fisheries have stagnated – at 90.9 million 
tonnes in 201659 – and are unlikely to grow in the decades 
to come. In comparison, aquaculture production (food 
fish) was estimated at 80 million tonnes the same year, 
and is projected to increase by 2.1% per year in FAO’s 
2030 scenario.
At the same time, a “common feature of the Blue 
Growth discourse [is] its ambivalent treatment of 
capture fisheries”.60 For example, the EU’s five areas 
cited for blue growth are aquaculture, coastal tourism, 
marine biotechnology, ocean energy, and seabed 
mining.61 Similarly, as demonstrated by the national level 
examples (see Boxes 1-4), capture fisheries are generally 
not a central consideration in the new ocean space 
arrangements fuelled by the blue economy agenda. FAO’s 
Blue Growth Initiative, however, is one of the few global 
schemes that has sought to include capture fisheries 
along with aquaculture.
Furthermore, the very serious ecological impacts of 
overfishing, habitat destruction and ocean pollution that 
limit available catch add to the marginal role that capture 
fisheries play in most blue growth initiatives. “These trends 
have resulted in policy narratives which position capture 
fisheries as ‘doomed’, or subject to ‘inevitable decline’.”62
Here a problem emerges: an increasing global 
demand	for	fish	protein63 and declining wild 
fish	stocks.	The	protein	fix	for	this	problem	
appears to be the framing of large-scale 
aquaculture	as	the	future	of	fisheries.
 
The protein fix
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BOX 3
Turkey’s transition into aquaculture
Insights from Turkey’s rapidly expanding aquaculture industry reveal that large-scale fishing enterprises 
are the ones surviving the transition, while pressure on fish stocks continues. As Ertör and Ortega-Cerdá 
explain: “This trend transforms the practices of seafood production from capture to farming while opening 
new frontiers for capital, with new types of investments.”68 Turkish regulatory changes encouraged con-
centration within the sector by rejecting applications for marine aquaculture investments of less than 250 
tons. This, coupled with the large amount of capital needed to enter a quickly intensifying sector, resulted 
in the direct or indirect elimination of small-scale fish farms by “growing companies and growing farms”.69 
Aquaculture in Turkey shifted from production volumes of 1,500 fish per farm in 4 cubic metre wooden 
cages in the 1990s to one million fish per farm housed in circular cages of 50 metres in diameter.70 In 
short, the rapid growth in aquaculture has squeezed small-scale production out of the market.
The relationship between capture fisheries and aquaculture is often framed as if aquaculture will relieve 
the oceans of the ecological stress caused by overfishing. In fact, the dependence on anchovy for fish meal 
in Turkish aquaculture has put additional stress on anchovy stocks in the Black Sea. In the words of one 
industrial fisherman and fish meal producer in Turkey, “this creates its own capture fishing economy and 
increases the pressure on wild fish stocks instead of decreasing it. So, it leads to a paradox between cap-
ture fisheries and intensive marine aquaculture production.”71 The global surge in aquaculture celebrated 
in blue growth policies raises many questions about social and ecological impacts that warrant further 
research. But what is clear is that “instead of providing a solution to declining fish stocks, the intensive ma-
rine aquaculture of carnivorous species only solves the crisis of capital in the short term, and its expansion 
ends up putting more pressure on capture fisheries”.72
In the past 30 years, aquaculture production has exploded, 
outpacing the growth of capture fisheries at an average 
rate of 8.6% per year. Aquaculture is now responsible for 
almost half of the fish we eat.64 It is true that this growing 
sector has provided a steady protein fix over the past three 
decades, but it relies on vast energy inputs and increasing 
volumes of capture fish, soy, rapeseed, sunflower and 
wheat for feed. Furthermore, it creates a series of social 
and ecological issues along the way. An inherent problem 
within this fix is its dependency on increasing volumes of 
wild capture fish in order to produce increasing volumes 
of aquaculture species. This is particularly the case for 
the production of carp species, marine shrimp, salmon, 
tilapia and other finfish.65 In 2016, close to 15 million 
tonnes of wild capture fish, or 13% of global wild fish 
catches, was used for fish meal production,66 and growing 
aquaculture production (species relying on fish meal and 
fish oil for feed) will inevitably lead to more pressure on 
and competition for wild capture fish.
This also raises a fundamental question of who has 
the right to fish stocks: local fishing communities that 
rely on fish for livelihoods, healthy food and nutrition, 
or transnational corporations that hunt for pelagic fish 
stocks in foreign waters to feed the growing large-scale 
aquaculture industry? As described in The Global Ocean 
Grab, “aquaculture is another dynamic whereby control 
over aquatic resources is captured by the corporate 
seafood regime, at the expense of the people depending 
on these resources”.67 As the blue growth paradigm 
gains support, small-scale fishing communities become 
increasingly marginalised.
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Framed as a response to climate change concerns, the 
blue economy discourse at the global level has a strong 
focus on emerging industries: alternative wind and 
tidal energy as well as the deep sea extraction of rare 
minerals.73 Concurrently, the oil and gas industry is a 
sprawling and expanding system, and represents one of 
the largest forces in the ocean (and global) economy. As 
the OECD figure below illustrates, offshore oil and gas 
accounted for almost 34% of the total value of ocean-
based industries in 2010, equivalent to USD 510 billion. 
In comparison, industrial capture fisheries, according to 
the OECD, accounted for USD 15 billion.74
Although figures vary from one report or agency to 
another, the bottom line is that industrial fishing accounts 
for an almost insignificant proportion of the global 
ocean economy when compared to oil and gas, and this 
difference is projected to increase. Meanwhile, the value 
of small-scale fisheries is not accounted for, nor are fishers 
considered important social actors despite the fact that 
their livelihoods and human rights depend on their access 
to marine resources.
 
The ecological impact of oil and gas extraction on oceans 
(especially since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010), 
and the broader effect of fossil fuels and carbon emissions 
on the climate are now undeniable. According to the 
OECD, “[t]he sea is fluid and interconnected. Implication: 
What happens in one place may affect what happens 
elsewhere, as pollutants and alien species are carried by 
ocean currents and/or vessels to much greater distances 
than on land.”75
According to Watts, the vast network of wells, pipelines, 
oil tanker and so forth that make up the global ‘petro-
infrastructure’ is responsible for almost 40% of global C02 
emissions. 76 In its New Policy Scenario,77 the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that “natural gas demand 
[will] rise by almost 50% [from 2016] to 2040 and oil 
consumption [will] continue to grow.” The largest area of 
growth in both oil and gas production is projected to come 
from deepwater exploration, with off-shore gas production 
in particular skyrocketing by 69% (2.2% per year) from 
2016 to 2040.78 In other words, “This imperative drives 
the oil frontier to the ends of the earth, or more properly 
a mad gallop to the bottom of the ocean. Deepwater 
exploration is the new mantra.”79
Value added of ocean-based industries in 2010 by industry
Note: Artisanal fisheries are not included in this overview. 
Source: Numbers based on figure 1.2 and data in OECD (2016) 
StatLink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933334614
Port activities 13%
Industrial	fish	processing	5%
Offshore	wind	0.8%
Shipbuilding and repair 4%
Water transport 5%
Industrial marine aquaculture 0.8%
Industrial	capture	fisheries	1%
Maritime equipment 11%
Offshore	oil	and	gas	34%
Maritime and coastal tourism 26%
The energy/extractive fix
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BOX 4
The Netherlands: wind energy, the public face of ongoing offshore 
drilling
The government of the Netherlands, a public supporter of FAO’s Blue Growth Initiative, has developed its 
own Policy Document on the North Sea, 2016-2021 that “ties in with the ‘Blue Growth’ strategy, focused 
on sustainable growth in the marine, maritime and coastal economies, as formulated by the European 
Commission”.80 Using the exercise of maritime spatial planning, this policy document seeks to clarify how 
permits for the use of ocean space will be granted. To explain these priorities, current and future scenar-
ios for each of the activity areas in the blue economy are described. Lots of emphasis is put on the Dutch 
“energy transition at sea”81 and the emerging wind energy sector as evidence of the value put on sustain-
ability.
Existing oil and gas infrastructure is identified as a possible site for investment, both for maintenance as 
well as renovation in order to accommodate wind energy. Both energy industries could be supported 
through the sharing of helipads and other infrastructure. This case highlights some questions about the 
degree to which oil and gas companies (within the Netherlands and elsewhere) see entering into alterna-
tive energy development in the ocean as a hedge against price slumps, or as a way to continue controlling 
and investing in ocean infrastructure that also serves offshore drilling.
The problem: how to advance the supposed 
sustainability agenda of blue growth without 
going head to head with the oil and gas sector?
This central tension highlights the importance of 
understanding the relationship between the oil and gas 
industry and blue growth policy spaces (across different 
scales). This complex empirical and contextually specific 
issue merits much deeper investigation than is feasible in 
this short brief. However, an initial exploration into these 
questions (see Boxes 4 and 5) reveals that national level 
blue growth policies do not dare to limit offshore oil and 
gas development. Rather, they attempt to take advantage 
of existing oil and gas infrastructure and expertise under 
the auspices of transferring capacity to other sectors. 
In	other	words,	the	energy	fix:	blue	growth	policies	
allocate	ocean	space	to	expanding	offshore	drilling,	
and provide opportunities for new uses of existing 
ocean infrastructure. The minimal public focus on or 
engagement with the oil and gas industry downplays 
the centrality of this sector to ocean governance, thus 
shielding it from unwanted scrutiny. Important questions 
remain about the role of ‘blue finance’ in the expansion 
of extractive industries at sea (oil, gas and deep sea rare 
minerals).
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Tellingly, the fine print demonstrates very clearly that this move into alternative energy will in no way limit 
or interrupt the expansion of oil and gas extraction. The document goes on to recognise that competing 
interests may emerge, and provides guidance for public servants who must assess who should be granted 
permits. It states that “the Cabinet is giving priority to activities of national interest: shipping, oil and gas 
extraction, CO2 storage, generation of sustainable (wind) energy, sand extraction and replenishment, and 
defense”.82 In the spatial plan, all other sectors are allocated defined areas, while fishing is assigned to the 
undefined area not “closed for energy and nature.”83 In fact, the report very clearly states: “Due to the roll-
out of wind energy, energy production at sea will take up more space. In some cases, commercial and rec-
reational sailing vessels will need to alter their course, and the fishable area will shrink”84 (emphasis added).
The spatial plan offers an almost surgical tool for slicing up, doling out or even grabbing access to ocean 
resources from previous users. Under the banner of an “energy transition at sea” towards wind energy, 
the proposal is in fact not at all a territorial transition from one energy regime to another. Along with wind 
energy, the space allocated to oil and gas is projected to expand, and hence the space for fishing (both 
small-scale and industrial) will shrink. When push comes to shove, the Dutch government makes it clear 
that priority will be given to oil and gas.
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The interest in seabed mining, especially targeting rare 
earth elements, has picked up in recent years. This, 
according to the OECD, has been driven economically by 
“rising demand and price increases” stemming in particular 
from ‘green energy technologies’ (e.g. wind turbines and 
photovoltaic batteries that rely on these minerals) and 
politically by the interest of the EU and others to de-link 
from current source countries China and DRC. Seabed 
mining is seen as the solution to both of these issues.91 
As expressed by the Chief Executive of Nautilus Mining, 
“[t]he seafloor contains some of the largest known 
accumulations of metals essential for the green economy, 
in concentrations generally much higher than on land, 
so it is inevitable that we will eventually recover essential 
resources from the seafloor.”92 And in early 2018, the 
Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) stated that “we are now at the stage where we can 
see that deep sea minerals can provide a stable and 
secure supply of critical minerals […] having the potential 
to provide a low cost, environmentally sound, supply of 
the minerals needed to drive the smart economy, they 
could also contribute to the Blue Economy of several 
developing States.”93
BOX 5
Norway: exporting the carbon footprint and market oil industry 
expertise to other countries
Although only about 2% of global crude oil comes from Norway’s continental shelf, the country is the third 
largest producer of natural gas in the world, supplying some 25% of the EU’s total consumption.85 The 
Norwegian government has provided funding for FAO’s Blue Growth Initiative via its development agency, 
NORAD, and has incorporated blue growth discourse into its national ocean policy documents. However, 
this longstanding northern petroleum power is clutching on to the role of oil in its future ocean strategy. 
As the government’s 2017 Ocean Strategy explains: “Petroleum technology is at the centre of the devel-
opment of ocean-based aquaculture and ocean-based renewable energy.”86 Rather than move away from 
petroleum, Norway is essentially doubling down on its oil and gas commitments while positioning itself as 
the global maritime knowledge hub set to provide “technology and competence from the petroleum in-
dustry to other areas”.87
This global positioning is in line with the country’s general approach of pushing fossil fuels abroad – almost 
all Norwegian oil and gas is exported, representing more than a third of the value of total exports – while 
cleaning up its energy use at home.88 National company Statoil has been actively leading the charge to drill 
in the Arctic as ice melts, and started work on five new exploration wells in the Barents Sea in 2017. That 
same year, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate confirmed that oil production had increased for three 
years in a row and that the Norwegian continental shelf was churning out gas at record levels. These rates 
are only expected to continue over the next few years.89 And as the Norwegian Ocean Strategy outlines, 
“the oil and gas sector will remain the most important core market for most supply businesses”.90 The cas-
es from the Netherlands, Norway and South Africa illustrate that the blue growth framework fails to curb 
the extraction of fossil fuels. While the blue growth discourse at the global level (as for example articulated 
at Rio+20 and in FAO’s Blue Growth Initiative) seeks to highlight the centrality of environmental sustainabil-
ity, it becomes clear that national level blue growth strategies fail to address the paramount problem of 
the burning of fossil fuels, and that in practice the focus is on accommodating the continued expansion of 
the industry.
Deep sea mining: bolstering blue growth or wreaking ecological havoc with  
no knowledge of the consequences
16  |  The Blue Fix: Unmasking the politics behind the promise of blue growth transnationalinstitute
Many sites currently targeted for the extraction of rare 
earth elements are in international waters. As established 
in UNCLOS, the ocean area beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the coast (EEZ) is classified as a common good 
of humanity and simply referred to as “the Area.” The 
Area represents nearly half of the planet’s surface and 
is governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). 
The ISA is made up of 168 representatives of member 
states, each of which appoint 36 individuals to the Legal 
and Technical Commission (LTC) that is in turn charged 
with managing requests for access and permits for mining. 
The LTC generally convenes and makes decisions behind 
closed doors and does not reveal what companies are 
finding at the bottom of the ocean – even to the ISA 
member state representatives. In the words of one 
environmental observer of the ISA, “You’ve got [30] people 
making decisions about half the planet behind closed 
doors.”94 As Kristina Gjerde, Senior High Seas Adviser at 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
told the Council of ISA member states: “There is a large 
risk that we will not know what we have lost until it is 
indeed gone.”95 As the ISA moves towards the next phase 
of granting exploitation contracts, “[t]he tension between 
the ISA’s dual – and conflicting – mandates to promote the 
exploitation of the little-known seafloor that covers about 
half the planet while ensuring its protection” becomes 
more and more evident.96
In addition to this mining-friendly climate, draft ISA 
regulations have cited environmental priorities but lack 
detail describing how this will be ensured.97 According to 
the OECD report, “[e]ven the most careful deep sea mining 
will disturb the marine environment. The generally held 
view is that industrial-scale mining will inflict a range of 
harm that will irreversibly alter the deep oceans, but as yet 
there is no clear picture of what those impacts might be.”98 
Meanwhile, specific blue economy initiatives are drawing 
funding and opening doors for private contractors to gain 
access to ISA governed ocean space.
BOX 6
Small Island Developing States: sponsors of deep sea mining
Although Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are set to be among the most impacted by climate change, 
they have also been the poster children of the blue economy expansion into deep sea mining efforts. In 
2011, Robert G. Aisi, Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the UN speaking on behalf of the 
Pacific SIDS98 represented at the preparatory committee for Rio+20, declared, “In addition, an issue that 
we consider will emerge as topical in the post-Rio+20 period in connection with the Blue Economy is deep 
seabed mining. Although deep seabed mining and related activities may be a fairly new frontier for some 
countries, we see the developments in this area as one which will closely involve the Pacific Ocean and the 
Pacific SIDS.”99 Six years later in June of 2017, the UN Ocean Conference in New York marked the launch 
of “the UN-DESA [Department of Economic and Social Affairs] and ISA voluntary commitment partnership 
on [the] Abyssal initiative for Blue Growth.” The partnership is engaged in a “quest for a Blue Econ-
omy through the promotion of socio-economic benefits for developing countries, including SIDS” 
as well as increasing scientific knowledge and research capacity and promoting the blue economy 
concept as a means to enable SIDS to “benefit fully from the sustainable development of their deep-sea 
mineral resources”.100
One of the key ways that SIDS are engaging in deep sea mining exploration is by sponsoring contractors 
seeking licenses. According to ISA policy, when private companies want exploration contracts in the Area 
they must be sponsored by an ISA member state and have a subsidiary company in that state. In practi-
cal terms, the sponsorship approach provides opportunities for mining corporations to obtain contracts 
through SIDS.
As of August 2018, a total of 29 contracts for exploration had been granted by the ISA.101 The ISA is in the 
process of reviewing its ‘mining code’, which will then govern the allocation and management of exploita-
tion contracts. To date, none have been granted. Of the 29 contracts, most are sponsored by big econom-
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Although Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are set to be 
among the most impacted by climate change, they have also 
been the poster children of the blue economy expansion 
into deep sea mining efforts. In 2011, Robert G. Aisi, 
Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the UN 
speaking on behalf of the Pacific SIDS99 represented at the 
preparatory committee for Rio+20, declared, “In addition, 
an issue that we consider will emerge as topical in the post-
Rio+20 period in connection with the Blue Economy is deep 
seabed mining. Although deep seabed mining and related 
activities may be a fairly new frontier for some countries, we 
see the developments in this area as one which will closely 
involve the Pacific Ocean and the Pacific SIDS.”100 Six years 
later in June of 2017, the UN Ocean Conference in New 
York marked the launch of “the UN-DESA [Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs] and ISA voluntary commitment 
partnership on [the] Abyssal initiative for Blue Growth.” 
The partnership is engaged in a “quest for a Blue 
Economy through the promotion of socio-economic 
benefits for developing countries, including SIDS” as 
well as increasing scientific knowledge and research 
capacity and promoting the blue economy concept as a 
means to enable SIDS to “benefit fully from the sustainable 
development of their deep-sea mineral resources”.101
One of the key ways that SIDS are engaging in deep sea 
mining exploration is by sponsoring contractors seeking 
licenses. According to ISA policy, when private companies 
want exploration contracts in the Area they must be 
sponsored by an ISA member state and have a subsidiary 
company in that state. In practical terms, the sponsorship 
approach provides opportunities for mining corporations 
to obtain contracts through SIDS.
As of August 2018, a total of 29 contracts for exploration 
had been granted by the ISA.102 The ISA is in the process 
of reviewing its ‘mining code’, which will then govern the 
allocation and management of exploitation contracts. To 
date, none have been granted. Of the 29 contracts, most 
are sponsored by big economic powerhouse countries 
like China, Korea, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France, and they often provide 
ic powerhouse countries like China, Korea, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France, and they often provide access to their own public research agencies or state-owned mining compa-
nies. However, beginning in 2011, SIDS also began to sponsor private mining companies.
For example, in 2012 the nation of Tonga sponsored Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. (TOML) for the exploration 
of polymetallic nodules in the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone (a submarine fracture zone in the north-
ern Pacific Ocean). “TOML has agreed to a royalty with the Tongan government as part of its sponsorship 
agreement of US$1.25 per dry ton for the first 3 million dry tons of nodules mined per year, and US$0.75 
per dry ton for all subsequent tons mined thereafter in that same year.”102 TOML is 100% owned by Nau-
tilus Minerals, headquartered in Canada. Its largest shareholder (holding 30.4%) is MB Holding Company 
LLC., a multinational oil and gas drilling and oilfield services company headquartered in the Sultanate of 
Oman.
It is not only SIDS that are providing sponsorship for transnational interests. UK Seabed Resources holds 
two contracts for exploration, sponsored by the United Kingdom. However, UK Seabed Resources is a sub-
sidiary company of Lockheed Martin, a US-based defence and security company. Since the United States is 
not a signatory of UNCLOS, it is not represented on the ISA council of member states and therefore can’t 
sponsor its own contractors.
The United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Tongo effectively provide gateways into the deep sea for multi-
national mining companies. And proposals by UN-DESA and ISA – such as the Abyssal Initiative for Blue 
Growth – clarify that this is the vision for SIDS in the blue economy. As explained in the ISA concept 
paper for the 2017 UN Ocean Conference, Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga and the Cook Islands have provided spon-
sorship for new exploration contracts in the Area. The paper goes on to recommend close collaboration 
between private contractors, the ISA, and member states “in assisting interested States, and in particular 
SIDS, to draft their deep seabed mining regulatory frameworks”.103
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access to their own public research agencies or state-
owned mining companies. However, beginning in 2011, 
SIDS also began to sponsor private mining companies.
For example, in 2012 the nation of Tonga sponsored 
Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. (TOML) for the exploration of 
polymetallic nodules in the Clarion Clipperton Fracture 
Zone (a submarine fracture zone in the northern Pacific 
Ocean). “TOML has agreed to a royalty with the Tongan 
government as part of its sponsorship agreement of 
US$1.25 per dry ton for the first 3 million dry tons of 
nodules mined per year, and US$0.75 per dry ton for all 
subsequent tons mined thereafter in that same year.”103 
TOML is 100% owned by Nautilus Minerals, headquartered 
in Canada. Its largest shareholder (holding 30.4%) is 
MB Holding Company LLC., a multinational oil and gas 
drilling and oilfield services company headquartered in 
the Sultanate of Oman.
It is not only SIDS that are providing sponsorship for 
transnational interests. UK Seabed Resources holds 
two contracts for exploration, sponsored by the United 
Kingdom. However, UK Seabed Resources is a subsidiary 
company of Lockheed Martin, a US-based defence 
and security company. Since the United States is not a 
signatory of UNCLOS, it is not represented on the ISA 
council of member states and therefore can’t sponsor its 
own contractors.
The United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Tongo 
effectively provide gateways into the deep sea for 
multinational mining companies. And proposals by UN-
DESA and ISA – such as the Abyssal Initiative for Blue 
Growth – clarify that this is the vision for SIDS in the 
blue economy. As explained in the ISA concept paper for 
the 2017 UN Ocean Conference, Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga 
and the Cook Islands have provided sponsorship for 
new exploration contracts in the Area. The paper goes 
on to recommend close collaboration between private 
contractors, the ISA, and member states “in assisting 
interested States, and in particular SIDS, to draft their 
deep seabed mining regulatory frameworks”.104
Capital fixing and investment in the energy and extractive sectors
It is hard to stress enough just how massive a role oil 
and gas play in the global economy. The total value of 
the oil and gas market is US$3 trillion, and “the largest 
five oil companies’ collective revenues exceed the GDP 
of all of Africa”.105 But beyond the cash flow associated 
with traded goods, it is important to highlight the vast 
architecture of machinery, technology, infrastructure, 
transportation networks and other assets that capital is 
sunk into. According to Watts, this represents a value of 
some USD 40 trillion. He goes on to paint this picture:
Close to 5 million producing oil wells puncture the 
surface of the earth (77,000 were drilled [in 2011], 
4,000 offshore); 3,300 are subsea, puncturing the 
earth’s crust on the continental shelf in some cases 
thousands of meters below the sea’s surface. 
There are by some estimations over 40,000 oil 
fields in operation. More than 2 million kilometres 
of pipelines blanket the globe in a massive trunk-
network (another 180,000 kilometres will be 
built at a capital cost of over $265 billion over 
the next four years); another 75,000 kilometres 
of lines transport oil and gas along the sea floor. 
There are 6,000 fixed platforms, and 635 offshore 
drillings rigs (the international rig total for June 
2011 is over 1,158, according to Baker Hughes). 
Over four thousand oil tankers move 2.42 billion 
tons of oil and oil products every year – one-third 
of global seaborne trade; over eighty massive, 
floating production and storage vessels have been 
installed in the last five years.106
This vast built environment, what Carton has called the 
“fossil fuel landscape”,107 creates its own kind of inertia 
or ‘path-dependency’.108 This is because the massive 
amounts of money capital that become ‘fixed’ in it typically 
have a long turnover period, so the landscape “exercises 
a coercive power over future uses”.109 That is, capitalists 
that have made investments into fossil fuel extraction 
will not simply forsake the anticipated profits from their 
investments. Indeed, agreements such as the Energy 
Charter Treaty actively protect such investments – and 
even planned investments – from any type of political 
decisions that might impinge on expected profits.110 In 
this manner, investments into the built environment 
prohibit political change, as they lock a distinct logic into 
the landscape. Expansion is key to ensuring returns on the 
investments needed to develop such expensive systems 
for offshore extraction.
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Amidst this level of investment, the oil market hit a price 
slump in 2014. In addition, increasing public outcry over 
climate change is causing rumblings that imply that 
it might be time to come to terms with our petroleum 
addiction. Post-2014 saw a return to cheaper land-based 
shale extraction, sowing concern over all of the money 
that has been sunk into offshore infrastructure and the 
comparatively high cost of oil and gas extraction in the 
ocean. As rebounding oil and gas markets are expected 
in the coming years, blue growth provides an elegant 
policy framework to keep investment flowing into multi-
use ocean infrastructure while ensuring new allocations of 
ocean space for the expansion of offshore drilling.
One proposal coming out of blue growth policy circles 
that could defray significant costs to oil companies and 
taxpayers is multi-use platforms. Oil and gas reserves, 
especially in Europe, are ageing and subject to the 
provisions in the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) 
that force oil companies to fully decommission inactive 
infrastructure.111 Between 2017 and 2025, some 200 
platforms must be removed, 2,500 wells closed down 
and 78,000 kilometres of pipeline decommissioned across 
the North Sea.112 This is a very complex and expensive 
obligation. For the UK, the government estimates that 
the cost will be GBP 39 billion, while the independent 
research organisation Intergenerational Foundation 
calculates more like GBP 80 billion.113 Some 10% of rigs 
in the Gulf of Mexico have been left as part of a nationwide 
Rigs to Reefs programme.114 Rather than reefs, current 
proposals for the North Sea involve exploring the option 
of turning old oil platforms into aquaculture facilities or 
wind farms.115 The main challenge is how to get around 
the OSPAR regulation, which mandates decommissioning 
in signatory countries.116 If such regulatory hurdles can 
be dealt with, blue growth policy recommendations 
like multi-purpose offshore platform transitioning and 
development117 represent ways in which capital can be 
freed up for investment in new and other types of offshore 
projects that are also given priority in marine spatial 
planning efforts.
In deep waters, it remains to be seen just how big of an 
economic opportunity rare earth elements represent 
for seabed extractive industries. Although technology is 
rapidly advancing, exploration requires lots of upfront 
investment: bankrolling a research ship and a remotely 
operated vehicle capable of reaching deep sea vents 
runs around USD 75,000 per day.118 Until ISA exploitation 
regulations are clear, investment is not likely. Kris Van 
Nijen, Sea Mineral Resource’s general manager, says: 
“We’re talking about more than hundreds of millions 
of dollars. If we do not know how we are going to be 
regulated in the future, we cannot invest that kind of 
money.”119
The blue fix is by no means complete. Can blue economy 
actually drum up the needed financing for ongoing 
investment in ocean infrastructure? And if not, where is 
it going to come from? Perhaps more importantly, will 
the momentum behind blue growth policies provide 
the needed push to overcome the regulatory hurdles to 
capital accumulation (like the OSPAR obligations or the ISA 
mining code)? These questions merit further research and 
social and political positioning as the blue growth agenda 
is rolled out at the national level.
Conclusions
Blue growth is a broad and ambiguous concept, home to 
many visions and ideologies. This vagueness has helped 
to attract a diverse coalition of actors, each able to project 
their own interpretations onto these policy agendas. For 
some it is about conservation and renewable energy, 
whereas in practice offshore drilling remains untouched. 
Wrapping blue growth in a framework of sustainability 
helps to address growing concerns about climate change, 
and channeled through sustainable tourism and large-
scale Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) makes it profitable. 
This is the conservation fix.
For others, it is about a transition to aquaculture that 
cedes ocean space to other uses and avoids dealing with 
the problem of decreasing fish stocks and the need for 
increasing quantities of feed based on capture fish and 
other ingredients including soy, rapeseed, sunflower and 
wheat. This is the protein fix.
Finally, marine spatial planning at the national level 
concretely prioritises the sectors that generate the 
greatest profit: in particular oil and gas and shipping and 
mining. This approach also offers more possibilities to 
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profit from existing infrastructure and expertise in the 
development of alternative energies and aquaculture. 
This is the energy/extractive fix.
As comprehensive as the blue growth agenda is, there 
remain irreparable ecological and social contradictions. 
And social and environmental conflicts will only be further 
fuelled as long as these contradictions remain. As with 
earlier historical instances of enclosure and shifts in 
the regulatory regime, heads of state seem to primarily 
view blue growth as a means to solve conflicts between 
competing ocean industries. And this happens within the 
context of the coercive imperative to ensure compound 
growth rates by any means necessary.
Blue growth thus manifests as a balancing act to frame 
these attempts as ‘sustainable’ and in everyone’s interest. 
However, it is important to highlight that the millions of 
people who to this day still rely on ocean space for their 
lives and livelihoods – specifically small-scale fishers – have 
for the most part not been invited to the blue party. This 
poses very tricky political questions for fisher movements 
and allies. Some are trying to arrange an invitation into 
the blue economy, believing that this is the surest way 
to secure rights to their fishing grounds. Others however 
are more skeptical, having witnessed how the blue growth 
agenda pushes small-scale fishers into an impossible 
corner.
Co-existing with the expanding development of ocean 
industries is not easy for fishers: the spaces that they 
depend on for their lives and livelihoods are rapidly 
being corralled into plans for new ports, tourist facilities, 
shipping lanes, new conservation and mining areas, 
and new aquaculture ponds. And if they manage to 
defend a particular fishing area, the combined impact of 
construction, contamination and climate change means 
it is less and less likely that fish will be plentiful there. In 
order to survive, they must go further and further out to 
sea, increasing their fuel costs as well as their exposure 
to the dangers of the ocean and to possible conflicts with 
industrial fishing fleets. For many, fishing is no longer 
viable.
In the face of already plummeting fish stocks, the need for 
an ecologically and socially sensitive approach to fishing is 
only going to increase. This is more obvious to small scale 
fishers than to others, but the terms of entry into the blue 
growth party make it nearly impossible for them to survive 
and uphold such standards. Herein lies the ugly secret 
at the heart of the blue growth agenda: the appetite for 
oil, gas, minerals, protein and conservation that is fuelling 
and shaping the agenda is fundamentally unsustainable. 
The three-part deal with conservation, protein and 
energy/extractive fixes that has been cobbled together 
fails to address the underlying causes of environmental 
degradation – including climate change – and condemns 
the population of small-scale fishers to an increasingly 
desperate future of scrambling for shrinking space and 
fewer fish.
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